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ENTRIES INTO AND EXITS FROM THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the entries and exits in the U.S. steel industry.
First, reasons for and the performance of entries are examined and then
characteristics of exits are studied. It is found that entry-with-new-
technology strategy results in different performance, and ineffectiveness
and inefficiency contribute equally to the exits from the steel industry.

Introductton
How to compete is the central issue of the business level strategy.
The behaviors of incumbent firms, entrants, and exits have significant
impact on competition. Analyzing entry and exit conditions is one step
toward studying competitive strategies and is particularly useful from
two perspectives. From an incumbent firm's perspective, understanding
entry conditions helps the firm to identify an important source of
competition and to formulate an appropriate strategy to cope with it.
Additionally, an understanding of exit behaviors helps the incumbent
firm avoid losing competitiveness and being forced out of the market.
From a potential entrant's perspective, understanding entry conditions
provides guidelines toward entry strategy. This study focuses on a
particular entry strategy, the entry-with-new-technology strategy, and
the resulting exits, all within the context of the U.S. steel
industry.
During last two decades, the most significant structural changes in
the U.S. steel industry have been the penetration of foreign steel,
notably Japanese steel, and the emergence of minimills. With a scale
of less than one million net ton annual capacity, minimills, by employ-
ing Electric Arc Furnace and continuous casting as their primary steel-
making technologies, have successfully made inroads into the markets
that were originally dominated by integrated steel mills. Japanese
steelmakers have also acquired a significant share of the U.S. market.
As the demand for steel has remained stagnant, these entries have
forced some integrated steel firms to close their plants with sizeabLe
losses. Before explaining the specific entry and exit phenomena in the
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U.S. steel industry, we first review relevant entry and exit literature
and provide an introduction to steelmaking technologies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The decision of whether to enter an industry depends on the per-
ceived profits after entry as compared to the costs involved in over-
coming entry barriers. Entry studies either focus on the entry
barriers inherent to a particular industry, such as economies of scale
[Bain 1956], or on incumbent firms' strategies which deter entry by
post-entry profits reduction, such as limiting pricing [Gaskin 1971],
excess capacity [Spence 1977], and spatial competition [Hay 1976,
Schmalensee 1978]. As noted by Bernheim [1984], studies on entry
deterrence strategies either ignore the sequential aspect of entry
deterrence or are extremely asymmetric, focusing on a dominant incum-
bent firm. Ignoring the sequential aspect of entry is not consistent
with the strategic viewpoint because a firm's strategy should consider
not only one entrant, but all potential entrants. Extremely asymmetric
treatment narrows the applicability of the models to managerial decision
making. Other problems with entry studies are that, with few exceptions
[Gaskin 1971, Harrigan 1981], most of these studies lack empirical evi-
dence. Furthermore, entry deterrence studies assume identical produc-
tion function for potential entrants and incumbent firms. However,
under continuous technological change, this assumption does not hold
and thus entry behavior needs to be analyzed from a different angle.
The notion of critical fixities, proposed by Tang and Zannetos
[1986], could explain entry behavior under continuous technological
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change. As Tang and Zannetos [1986] show, unless the marginal cost of
the existing equipment plus the gains from waiting for advanced equip-
ment exceed the average cost of the new equipment plus switching costs,
a firm will not adopt a process innovation. The combined effects of
the marginal cost and switching cost on restraining innovation adoption
represent the critical fixities of a firm. A corollary of this propo-
sition is that entries and exits will occur. If an innovation is not
advanced enough to bring down the average cost, critical fixities will
cause existing firms to not adopt a process innovation even though this
will put themselves in a cost disadvantageous position relative to the
entrants with the new technologies. As a result, entrants will easily
outperform existing firms and sometimes make an extra profit. In other
words, the critical fixities of the incumbent firms create "certain
unimi tability" , as opposed to "uncertain instability" [Lippman and
Rumelt 1982] which acts as an "entry facilitator", as opposed to an
entry barrier, to invite entry. In a stagnant industry such as the
steel industry, entries create exits. Therefore, critical fixities may
explain the coexistence of entries and exits which result from tech-
nological innovations.
This paper studies entries into and exits from the steel industry
in order to answer the questions: (i) what are the characteristics of
the entries? (ii) how well do the entrants perform relative to existing
firms? and (iii) what are the characteristics of exits? An under-
standing of steelmaking technologies is necessary to understand the
characteristics of new-technology entries and exits.
-4-
STEELMAKING TECHNOLOGIES
The major reasons that steel is a widely used material are its high
strength, reasonable stiffness, and ductility. These properties are
largely determined by the chemical composition of steel. The purpose
of steelmaking is to obtain the desired chemical composition by elimi-
nating unwanted elements found in the iron ore or scrap, from which
steel is made.
The basic process of steelmaking from iron ore is to first obtain
liquid iron by burning iron ore with coal, and then refine the liquid
iron into liquid steel. The refinement is done in one of two kinds of
furnaces: the Open Hearth (OH) or the Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF).
Then, the Liquid steel is rolled or cast, and formed into the desired
shapes. Steel plants that produce steel products through these pro-
cesses are called "integrated" steel mills. Another method of making
steel is to refine scrap in an Electrical Arc Furnace (EF) and then
roll, or cast the liquid steel into the desired shapes.
The steel industry has experienced significant changes in each of
the steelmaking stages. First, massive cheap iron ore reserves were
discovered in Brazil and Australia in the 60's. Second, gigantic blast
furnaces were developed in the 60's, which increased by six times the
daily output rate. Third, the BOF was commercialized in 1954 and soon
replaced the OH as the dominant steelmaking technology. The BOF, how-
ever, requires more hot metal (liquid iron) than the OH. Converting an
OH shop to a BOF shop, depending upon existing hot metal supply,
requires additional hot metal production facilities such as blast fur-
naces and sinter plants. Fourth, continuous casting, developed in the
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late 60's and earLy 70's, replaced ingot casting as the main casting
technology. Continuous casting can reduce lahor requirements hy two-
thirds and also reduces the economies of scale in casting to roughly an
annual capacity of half a million tons (Battelle Memorial Institute,
1964). Finallv, in the 60's, the capacity of the F,F was enlarged
significantly. As the scale of the FF increased, and as the economies
of scale in casting decreased, it hecame economical to produce low car-
bon steel through the EF at an annual capacity less than 1 million tons.
Combining the EF and continuous casting created the so called
"minimills": steel mills with less than a 1 million ton annual capa-
city. Continuous casting plus relatively cheap scrap provide minimills
significant cost advantages over integrated mills. However, because
scrap contains a significant amount of "tramp elements"—unwanted ele-
ments that cannot be removed by the EF , the ROF nor the OH—the steel
made from minimills cannot be rolled into steel sheets and strips
because tramp elements are detrimental to their quality. Thus, those
integrated mills which produce steel sheets and strips are immune from
competition with minimills.
ENTRANTS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE
An EF shop uses 100% scrap and thus does not need blast furnaces
and iron ore processing equipment to supply hot metal. Therefore, con-
verting an OH shop to an EF shop will make hot metal producing facili-
ties useless. Because of this, the marginal cost of the OH was lower
than the average cost of EF [Tang 1985]. Therefore, using the notion
of critical fixities, the OH shops of the early 60 ' s should not have
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been replaced by the EF , even though the average cost of the OH was
higher than that of the EF. As integrated mills were not willing to
switch to the EF, minimills equipped with the EF and continuous casting
easily surpassed the integrated mills. If prices are set by the cost
of the dominant technology, in this case, the OH, the minimills can
earn an extra profit. Motivated by this profit, some existing firms,
which have knowledge of the EF may exploit their expertise by expanding
their facilities. Additionally, new firms may be formed to take advan-
tage of the new technology and some steel product distributors may ver-
tically integrate backward. All of these changes have occurred in the
steel industry in the last two decades.
A list of entrants with new technologies is given in Table 1.
One of these entrants used the BOF to enter the integrated steelmaking
business, McLouth Steel. This is because substantial economies of
scale in both hot metal production and steelmaking stages created high
entry barriers to those intending to use the BOF. However, over twenty
minimills entered the low carbon steel market by using the EF. These
minimills essentially produce low-end steel products such as steel bars
and wire rod. Over 90 percent of these minimills also employed another
major innovation: continuous casting. At the same time, integrated
steelmakers were slow in switching to the EF ; only four OH shops have
been replaced by EF shops in the last two decades. Additionally, it
wasn't until after the early 60 ' s that the BOF was widely used. These
facts clearly show that the reluctance of existing firms to adopt new
technologies prompted entry of new firms to the industry.
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Insert Table 1 about here
Since those entrants were motivated by the extra profit that could
be realized through the use of new technologies, the performance of
those entrants is hypothesized to be better than that of the existing
firms. The following section compares the profitability of one company,
McLouth Steel and several minimills to that of large integrated steel
firms.
PERFORMANCE OF ENTRANTS: TWO CASES
The BOF Case: McLouth Steel
In the early 50's, before entering the integrated steel sector,
McLouth was engaged in the stainless steel business, using the EF as
its primary steelmaking technology. In 1954, McLouth opened the
first BOF shop in the U.S. To supply hot metal to its BOFs, McLouth
also built a new blast furnace that was one of the largest blast fur-
naces in the country. Four years later, McLouth added two larger BOFs,
and an even larger blast furnace: based on its height and diameter,
this blast furnace was the largest in the U.S. at the time. Through
this combination of modern blast furnaces and BOFs, McLouth had one of
the most advanced steelmaking facilities in the U.S.
Because the marginal cost of the OH was less than the average cost
of the BOF in the early 60's, most steel companies were not willing to
adopt modern steelmaking technologies. Since McLouth's competitors
were not willing to imitate its strategy, one would expect that McLouth's
profitability was higher than other integrated steel companies.
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Table 2 compares the return on investment (ROI) and the return on
sales (ROS) of McLouth Steel and the eight largest steel companies for
the periods 1956-59 and 1960-66. As this table shows, after McLouth
finished its BOF shop in 1960, its profits rose while the other com-
panies' profits fell. During 1956-1959, McLouth's profitability was
below the average of the eight largest steel companies. However, in
the following period, 1960-1966, McLouth's average profitability was 30
percent higher than these companies. These results conform to the
prediction that entrants will earn an extra profit by using the new
technologies that existing firms are not willing to adopt.
Insert Table 2 about here
However, the superior performance of McLouth did not last long. In
1980, McLouth went bankrupt. One reason is that McLouth's advantages
turned to disadvantages. McLouth was the first U.S. steel firm to adopt
the BOF. At the time, 1954, the BOF technology was rather premature;
furnace size was as small as 35 tons. 1958, McLouth added two 110 ton
BOF's. However, in the 60's, the size of the BOF improved significantly
and was capable of refining 300 tons of liquid steel within 40 minutes.
As McLouth's competitors adopted larger and more efficient BOF's,
McLouth's advantages began to disappear. Despite the advance in BOF
technology, in 1968 McLouth added two 110 ton BOFs , not the new 300 ton
ones, to replace its 35 ton BOFs. As a result, McLouth had five 110
ton BOFs, not two 300 ton BOFs. Perhaps the reason McLouth adopted the
less efficient BOFs was that it had to maintain compatibility of cranes
and transportation equipment between new furnaces and its existing 110
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ton furnaces. This need tor compatibility would have increased switch-
ing costs if McLouth had added 300 ton furnaces.
The McLouth case illustrates that, although early adopters of a new
technology gain a temporary cost advantage, other firms can come in
later with a better technology. As these other firms enter the market,
the critical fixities prevent the original early adopters from using
the better technology. The McLouth case also illustrates the leap-frog
type competition which can result from continuous technological change.
The same situation seems to be repeating itself in the case of Japanese
steelmakers. After two decades of dominance in the world steel market,
Japanese integrated steelmakers now are threatened by Korean and
Taiwanese steelmakers, who are using better technologies.
The Minimills Case
In the previous section, Table 1 gave a list of companies that
entered the low carbon steel market by using the EF and continuous
casting. Among those firms, only a few went public and among these,
only four are engaged primarily in the carbon steelmaking business,
competing directly with large, integrated steel mills.
In Table 3, the performance of these four minimills is compared
with that of integrated steel firms. Due to data availability, only
2
ROS is used as the performance indicator. For the period from 1970 to
1982, on the average, the four minimills earned 11.24 percent return on
sales while integrated firms earned only a fraction of that, 3.65 per-
cent. Given that minimills are less capital-intensive than integrated
mills, the ROI of minimills must be even higher than that of integrated
mills. Some of the integrated mills barely broke even and would rather
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have suffered an accounting loss than replace their out-of-date facili-
ties. For example, Kaiser Steel was in the red 7 out of 11 years and
yet did not replace its OHs until 1978, twenty years after its first
BOF installation.
The t-statistic of the ROS between the mlnimills and the integrated
mills is 5.71, with significance beyond the .01 level. Thus, the null
hypothesis that there is no performance difference between minimills
and integrated steel companies is rejected. Table 3 clearly indicates
how entrants took the opportunities created by technological advancement
and by the critical fixities of existing firms to earn an above-average
profit.
Insert Table 3 about here
In a stagnant industry such as the steel industry, these entrants
forced some plants to close. According to AISI's Directory, there were
53 integrated steel works which produced carbon steel by employing the
blast furnace and the OH in 1960. By 1983, sixteen of them were per-
manently shutdown, four were replaced by the EF , and only thirty-three
integrated steel works were still in operation. Although all plants
faced the same threats from minimills and imports, one might wonder whv
only some plants were closed, thereby causing significant financial
losses for their firms. The characteristics of these exits are inves-
tigated below and a simple model is derived which seeks to explain the
exit decision of an integrated mill.
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THE MODEL OF EXITS
Assuming a firm maximizes its market value, the major reason for
it to shut down a steel plant is that the cash flow of exit is higher
than the cash flows of other alternatives. For an aged integrated
steel plant using the old technology, the OH, the other alternatives
are to maintain current operations, or to replace OH shops with new
technologies, such as the BOF. If the firm chooses to maintain current
operations, the plant's net cash flow would be P-MC .., where P is the
old
price and MC ,, is the marginal cost of the existing product. If the
old rt ° r
plant is to be replaced by new technologies, the net cash flow is
P-AC - SC (2)
new
where AC is the average cost per unit using the new equipment and
SC is the unit switching cost. To close the plant, the unit net cash
flow of exit, C_ VT _, must be greater than the cash flow of the otherEXIT'
two alternatives. Thus, if
CWVT_ > Max [P-MC , ,, P-AC -SC] (3)bAl i old new
the firm will close the integrated plant.
Equation 3 indicates that, given the same cash flow of exit per
unit, the lower the price of the product, and the higher the MC , the
AC
, and the SC, the more likely it is that the integrated plant wi L
L
new
be closed. Several factors that affect the price, MC
, ,
, AC , and SC
old new
need to be discussed and tested. Then these factors will be used to
explain the exits from the steel industry.
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Hypotheses
First, due to the substantial economies of scale of the BOF, the
annual production capacity of a plant affects the AC . Small plantsr J r new r
are likely to have higher AC if they had been converted to the BOF.
To reduce the AC , the plant has to be expanded. This includes the
new
expansion of all facilities such as blast furnaces, sinter plants, and
rolling capacities. In a stagnant market, these expansions are hardly
justifiable. Therefore, it is expected that the smaller the annual
production capacity of an integrated steel plant, the more likely it is
that it will be closed.
Second, a typical integrated steel plant has several blast furnaces.
The average annual capacity of biT^t furnaces is an indicator, of their
efficiency. Integrated plants with smaller blast furnaces are more
likely to have higher marginal costs and thus will either be shut down
or be replaced by the BOF. Replacement, however, is unlikely to be the
choice because the inefficient blast furnaces will increase the average
cost of the BOF, which requires more hot metal. Additionally, switching
costs will increase if those blast furnaces are to be enlarged or
rebuilt. Therefore, plants of small blast furnaces are more likely to
be closed.
Third, since switching to the BOF requires more hot metal, low hot
metal availability increase switching costs. (Hot metal availability
is measured as the ratio of annual pig iron capacity to annual steel
capacity.
)
Fourth, as minimills enter the market, the prices of products made
by the EF could be lower because the EF has a lower average cost. But
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due to tramp elements In the scrap, those integrated plants producing
sheet and strip do not compete with minimills. Therefore, it is
expected that a higher percentage of sheet and strip capacities would
3increase the possibiLitv of the survival of an integrated steel plant.
In summarv, it's hypothesized that those plants characterized by
small size, small average size of blast furnace, low hot metal avail-
ability, and low steel sheet production capacity are likely to be
closed. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, discriminant ana-
lysis is used to test these hypotheses.
Empirical Analysis
For purposes of this analysis, two types of exits are used. The
first type is the exit from the integrated steelmaking business,
including four OH shops that shut down their integrated steelmaking
facilities and replaced them with the EF. The second type is the exit
from the steel industry, comprised of only those steel plants that were
permanentlv shut down before 1983. The results of the discriminant
analysis are summarized in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
The two discriminant functions using the two different exits show
significant discriminant power with the chi-square of the two equations
significant beyond the .001 level. Also, over eighty percent of the
cases are correctly classified. These results indicate that the
overall explanatory power of these two discriminant functions, con-
sisting of the four prediction variables mentioned above, is adequate.
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Standardized canonical coefficients indicate that the size of the
steel plant, the annual capacity of blast furnaces, and the percentage
of steel sheet capacity contribute more or less equally to the discri-
minant function. As is shown, their signs are consistent with expec-
tations. However, hot metal availability appears to contribute only
marginally.
Comparison of the discriminant functions of the two types of exit
shows that the contribution of the product mix variable to the discri-
minant function increases as the four EF replacements are included in
the analysis. The standardized canonical coefficient of SHTH, a
measure of hot rolled steel sheet and strip capacity, increases from
0.424 to 0.650. In addition, for those exits from the integrated steel
business, the product mix variable contributes the most to the discri-
minant function. These results reflect the technological limitation of
the EF. Because steel sheet and strip cannot be made from the steel
from the EF , having strip and sheet production capacity would reduce
the possibility of converting an integrated OH shop to an EF shop.
Therefore, the product mix variable becomes more significant for the
sample that includes the four OH shops which are replaced by the EF.
Interestingly, the discriminant function can provide some predic-
tions regarding future closings of integrated steelmaking facilities.
Using both equations, the five plants which have the highest negative
discriminant scores but which have not been shut down before 1983 are:
CF&I's Pueblo plant, United States Steel's Duquesne plant, Republic
Steel's Buffalo plant, Republic Steel's Gadsen plant, and Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel's Monessen plant. According to the discriminant func-
tion, these plants are misclassif led ; they should have been shut down
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before 1983 but they were not. Therefore, it is predicted that they
will be closed before other integrated plants that had not been closed
before 1983. This prediction is largely in line with what actually
occurred. In 1983, the first three plants were closed and discussion
was underway about selling the fourth. The fifth went bankrupt in
1985. Thus, here is an indication of the predictive power of the
discriminant functions.
These exits can be viewed as victims of technological innovations.
The impact of the EF and continuous casting can be seen from the fact
that integrated plants producing products similar to minimills are
likely to be forced to close because of the high switching costs of
converting non-competitive steel products to steel sheet and strip.
This reflects the ineffectiveness (undesirable output) of an integrated
steel plant relative to its minimill rivals. The impact of the BOF is
revealed by the fact that the small size of an integrated plant created
high switching costs and thus significantly reduced its chances of sur-
vival. Also, not surprisingly, efficiency plays an important role in
plant closings.
CONCLUSION AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
This paper exemplifies a techno-economic-strategic analysis in
which key characteristics of technologies are first analyzed, and eco-
nomic consequences are then derived, followed by strategic implica-
tions. Additionally, it demonstrates how technological innovations
coupled with critical fixities of a firm can partially explain the
entry, exit, and performance of firms in the U.S. steel industrv.
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This paper also illustrates that, because of the reluctance of
existing firms to switch to new technologies, entrants using these new
technologies entered the low carbon steel market and earned an extra
profit. The existing integrated firms would rather have suffered
accounting losses than replace their obsolete equipment as long as the
cash flow remained positive. However, entrants into the integrated
steel industry having new technologies, such as McLouth and the Japanese
steelmakers, enjoyed only short-term cost advantages. Critical fixi-
ties associated with new technologies inhibited them from adopting more
advanced technologies. Yet leap-frog type competition has not been
observed for minimills. This difference may be because (i) minimills
are less capital intensive than integrated mills, and therefore criti-
cal fixities are not as serious as for integrated mills and (ii) the
minimill sector is still expanding, creating many opportunities to
adopt new technologies. Therefore, the entry-with-new-technology stra-
tegy should be evaluated in light of future technological changes and
expansion possibilities.
Finally, it was shown that as the demand for steel leveled off,
those entrants forced some existing firms to close their plants and
even forced some integrated firms to go bankrupt. These exits are
characterized by high switching costs resulting from small size, and
low competitiveness resulting from improper product mix. It is shown
that inefficiency (caused by small furnaces) and ineffectiveness
(caused by improper product mix) contribute equally to the exits.
FOOTNOTES
See Battelle Memorial Institute [1964], and United Nation's [1962]
studies
.
2
Integrated steel companies began their diversification in the 1970s,
As a result, their performance cannot represent the performance of their
steelmaking business. To correct this, we use the information of their
steelmaking business as presented in the business segment section of
their annual reports. If business segment data are not available, we
use corporate data. It should be kept in mind that each company has
its own definition of "steelmaking" and each company has its own poli-
cies on allocating corporate expenses and transfer pricing. The use of
business segment information also leads us to choose ROS as the perfor-
mance indicator because information on "identifiable assets" and depre-
ciation for a particular business segment are not always available.
3
Only hot-rolled strip and sheet capacity is counted because cold-
rolled strip and sheet capacity can be utilized by purchasing hot-
rolled strip and sheet from other companies.
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TABLE 1
A PARTIAL LIST OF ENTRANTS INTO THE
LOW CARBON STEEL MARKET AFTER 1954
Annual Capacity
St eelmaking Casting as of 1982
Year Company Furnace Machine (in net tons)
195-4 McLouth BOF Ingot 1,000,000
1961-66 Border Steel EF Continuous 200,000
1963--70 Intercoastal
Steel EF ? 80,000
1964--78 Roblin Steel EF Continuous 200,000
1965--81 Florida Steel* EF Continuous 1,578,000
1966 Tennessee Forging EF Continuous 160,000
1967--79 North Star Steel* EF Continuous 1,140,000
1967 Keystone Group EF Continuous 800,000
1967 Witteman Steel EF Ingot 60,000
1968 Nucor Corporation* EF Continuous 2,000,000
1968--75 Northwestern Steel
& Wire* EF Continuous 2,400,000
1968--82 Marathon Steel EF Continuous 175,000
1968--75 Marion Steel EF Continuous 250,000
1968 Owen Electric
Steel EF Continuous 100,000
1969 Korf Industries EF Continuous 700,000
1970 Cascade Steel
Rolling Mills EF Continuous 275,000
1971 Razorback. Steel EF Cont inuous 120,000
1971--79 Connors Steel EF Continuous 200,000
1972 New Jersey Steel EF Cont inuous 200,000
TABLE 1 (continued)
1974 Mississippi Steel
Division EF
1974-83 Quanex Corporation EF
1975 Auburn Steel EF
1975 Chaparrel Steel EF
1976 Charter Electric
-
Melting EF
1977 Tamco EF
1979 Raritan River
Steel EF
? Means inf ormation on casti
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
180,000
460,000
250,000
950,000
120,000
300,000
600,000
method is not available.
Definition of Entrants: New firms entering the market with new
technologies or existing firms expanding their steelmaking capacities
over three times its original capacity in 1960.
* Indicates firms that expanded their capacities aggressively by
using new technologies.
Source: Iron and Steel Society, AIME Complete Listing: Electric Arc
Steelmaking Furnaces in United States
,
Warrendal , PA. : Iron and
Steel Society, AIME, 1982. Richard Diley and William Pietrucha,
Steel Industry in Brief: Data Book, U.S.A.
,
Green Brook, NJ . : Insti-
tute of Iron and Steel Studies, 1983. American Iron and Steel
Institute, Directory of Iron and Steel Works of U.S. and Canada
,
Washington, D.C.: American Iron and Steel Institute, various years.
Association of Engineers, Directory, Iron and Steel Plants , Pittsburgh,
PA: Association of Iron and Steel Engineers, 1984.
TABLE 2
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN MCLOUTH AND
THE EIGHT LARGEST STEEL COMPANIES
1956-1959 1960-1966
Company ROI ROS ROI ROS
McLouth 9.33 9.94 14.83 14.63
Armco 14.50 13.43
Bethlehem 13.61 13.26
Inland 15.14 13.99
Jones &
Laughlin 8.95 9.21
Kaiser 6.75 13.11
National 12.70 14.09
Republic 15.45 12.74
United
States 15.17 16.12
Largest 8
Average 12.78 13.24
9.93 10.44
9.41 9.95
12.40 12.95
8.51 8.75
5.04 8.30
10.96 12.32
7.99 8.33
8.23
9.06
10.95
10.25
Source: Moody's Investors Service Inc., Moody's Industrial Manual
,
New York: Moody's Investors Service Inc., 1956-1966.
TABLE 3
RETURN ON SALES (ROS) FOR MINIMILLS AND STEELMAKING
SEGMENT IN INTEGRATED STEEL FIRMS (IN PERCENTAGE)
Minimills Steelmaking Segment
Company Period ROS Company Period ROS
Nucor 1970-82 11.72 USS 1970-82 1.39
Northwestern
Steel and Wire 1970-82 13.06 Bethlehem 1970-82 2.32
Quanex Steel 1974-82 10.74 Inland 1970-81 8.70
Florida Steel 1970-82 9.44 Republic 1970-82 2.11
Kaiser 1970-82 0.62
National 1970-82 3.41
Armco 1970-81 4.50
LTV L970-81 4.88
Wheeling-
Pittsburgh 1970-82 1.30
Interlake 1970-81 4.39
Lone Star 1970-82 6.57
Average ROS: X=11.24 X=3.65
T-statistic=5.71
Source: Annual Reports, various years
TABLE 4
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS RESULTS OF EXITS
Percentage
Standardized of cases
Eq . Canonical Coefficients No.* Chi- Canonical Eigen- correctly
No. SIZE BFCAP HMA SHTH Obs . square Corr. value classified
Exits
from
steel
industry 1 0.486 0.569 0.114 0.424 46 18.92** 0.602 0.569 80.4
Exits
from
integrated
business 2 0.554 0.377 0.192 0.650 50 20.7** 0.602 0.570 82
* Kaiser Steel, McLouth Steel, and Jones and Laughlin's Aliquippa plant are
excluded due to their BOF capacity.
** Indicates significance level beyond the 0.001 level.
Definitions of Prediction Variables:
SIZE: annual steelmaking capacity (in million tons) as of 1960
BFCAP: average annual capacity of blast furnaces as of 1960
SHTH: hot-rolled steel sheet and strip capacity as a percentage of
total hot-rolled products capacity as of 1960
HMA: hot metal availability, measured as pig iron capacity over
steelmaking capacity.
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), Directory of Iron and
Steel Works in U.S. and Canada
,
(Washington, D.C., AISI), various
years
.
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